President Yoon in South Korea > Issue

1. Yoon Suk-yeol was originally a leftist during his time as a prosecutor.
2. In 2013, as Park Geun-hye's administration began, evidence of NIS (National Intelligence Service) manipulation of public opinion surfaced.
3. Moon Jae-in, who had lost the presidential election, called for a special investigation.
4. Recognized for his capabilities, Yoon Suk-yeol was appointed to lead the investigation.
5. The investigation exposed the NIS agents’ safe houses and collected testimony from over 130 witnesses.
6. Jo Young-gon, the chief prosecutor of the Seoul Central District, summoned Yoon dozens of times to order him to halt the investigation.
7. Yoon pushed forward with the investigation despite orders to stop.
8. The Park Geun-hye administration was at its peak, with the ruling Saenuri Party holding a supermajority of 152 seats.
9. Despite heavy pressure from superiors, Yoon persisted with the investigation.
10. During a National Assembly audit, Yoon famously declared, "I am loyal to the law, not to people."

11. The investigation revealed that the NIS had engaged in systematic opinion manipulation from 2009 to 2012, impacting elections.
12. Manipulating public opinion was effectively equivalent to election tampering.
13. This revelation significantly undermined the legitimacy of the Park Geun-hye administration.
14. Although the administration initially wielded immense power, its authority weakened early in its term.
15. As a result, Yoon was sidelined from the core of the prosecution.
16. He faced disciplinary actions and was transferred to Daegu and later to Daejeon, moving between regional posts.
17. Media occasionally reported on Yoon eating late-night meals in the cafeteria while working overtime.
18. Yoon’s father, Yoon Ki-jung, was a professor of applied statistics at Yonsei University.
19. Yoon Ki-jung was always worried about his son, Yoon Suk-yeol.
20. During a mock trial in law school, Yoon sentenced former president Chun Doo-hwan to death, which led him to flee to Gangwon-do to avoid police pursuit.

21. Yoon studied at Yonsei University’s library near his home but repeatedly failed the bar exam.
22. He spent time nursing a sick friend or traveling to Daegu as a groomsman before exams.
23. When Yoon finally passed the bar exam at the age of 32 after nine attempts, Yoon Ki-jung felt relieved.
24. As a prosecutor, Yoon didn’t save money.
25. He was generous to those around him, but his lack of financial stability deterred marriage prospects.
26. Feeling the need to earn money, Yoon resigned as a prosecutor and worked as a lawyer for a year.
27. While visiting the prosecutor's office as a lawyer, the smell of black bean noodles in the hallway reminded him that his place was in the prosecution.
28. After a year as a lawyer, he returned to the prosecution.
29. His father, who valued public service over money, was pleased with his decision.
30. After 20 years in public service, Yoon had only 20 million KRW ($16,000) in total assets when he got married in 2012.

31. The Sewol ferry disaster occurred in 2014.
32. The tragedy claimed 304 lives, including 250 students from Danwon High School.
33. Heartbreaking videos sent by students to their parents before the sinking were shared online.
34. Park Geun-hye was criticized for her failed initial response and mysterious seven-hour absence.
35. Media continuously linked the sorrow and tragedy of the Sewol disaster to Park’s leadership.
36. Bereaved families marched to the Blue House, demanding her resignation.
37. Public opinion polls showed that 82% blamed Park for the disaster.
38. Moon Jae-in sought someone decisive to take action.
39. He decided to bring Yoon Suk-yeol, who had been relegated to Daegu.
40. JTBC's revelation of Choi Soon-sil's tablet PC escalated the scandal.

41. Allegations about Viagra, shaman rituals, late-night meetings with men, and hidden assets worth 300 trillion KRW emerged, fueling public outrage against Park Geun-hye.
42. Yoon linked Choi Soon-sil and Park Geun-hye as a financial community, applying bribery charges.
43. Park made matters worse by admitting fault in a public apology.
44. Park was impeached, and Moon Jae-in became president.
45. Moon invested 200 billion KRW to salvage the Sewol ferry and conducted a joint inspection.
46. The cause of the sinking was identified.
47. Over 400 tons of rebar in the second-floor cargo hold exceeded the vessel’s capacity.
48. The first-floor cargo area carried over 30 large trucks, far beyond its limit.
49. Both rebar and trucks were improperly secured.
50. Proper cargo lashing is critical to a ship’s stability at sea.

61. Forensic investigations revealed numerous irregularities leading to the disaster.
62. Chonghaejin Marine Co. issued a departure order, claiming the Incheon-Jeju route was simple and posed no issues.
63. The route to Jeju required only a slight 10-degree turn near Jindo Island.
64. However, the captain instructed the third officer to steer two 5-degree turns instead of a single 10-degree turn, then left the bridge.
65. Near Byungpung Island, the third officer made an error, steering the ship into a J-shaped U-turn instead of a gradual turn.
66. The centrifugal force caused the cargo to shift to one side, resulting in an outward tilt.
67. Compounding the issue, the lack of sufficient ballast water prevented the ship from righting itself.
68. Consequently, the Sewol capsized and sank.
69. The CEO of Chonghaejin Marine was sentenced to seven years in prison, the third officer to ten years, and the captain received a life sentence.
70. When Park Geun-hye’s impeachment was upheld, the Constitutional Court excluded the Sewol disaster as a basis for judgment.

71. Park was impeached before the ferry was salvaged, and the administration changed hands.
72. Yoon Suk-yeol was credited for contributing to the regime change and was appointed chief of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office.
73. He turned his attention to remaining members of the Park administration, including Kim Ki-choon, Woo Byung-woo, and others implicated in the cultural blacklist scandal.
74. Moon Jae-in recognized Yoon as a trustworthy ally and appointed him Prosecutor General.
75. However, Yoon soon launched an investigation into Moon’s close associate, Cho Kuk.
76. Cho Kuk, a key political ally of Moon, faced scrutiny for allegations of corruption and irregularities.
77. The investigation’s direction raised questions about Yoon’s motivations, but he remained silent and continued his work.
78. Yoon’s investigation led to the arrest of Cho’s wife, Jung Kyung-shim, who was sentenced to four years in prison for academic fraud.
79. Yoon’s father, Yoon Ki-jung, had noticed statistical irregularities during the 2016 general election early voting process.
80. Early voting results, as a sample, should statistically align with the general voter population.

81. However, Yoon Ki-jung found anomalies where sample distributions deviated from the expected normal distribution.
82. In multiple constituencies, votes for the Democratic Party showed unusual clustering on the right side of the distribution curve.
83. Similar trends were observed in the 2020 general election, where early votes for the Democratic Party consistently defied statistical norms.
84. The greater the clustering of votes for the Democratic Party, the fewer votes there were for the opposition party in the same regions.
85. Yoon regarded his father as his greatest mentor and often credited him as a moral and intellectual pillar.
86. Both Yoon and his father were naturally drawn to examining numbers that deviated from the laws of probability.
87. Despite facing pressure from then-Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae, Yoon’s prominence grew due to the public backlash against perceived political interference.
88. This backfired against Moon’s administration, elevating Yoon’s profile as a viable conservative alternative.
89. In March 2021, Yoon resigned as Prosecutor General to run for president.
90. During primary debates in September 2021, Yoon began to highlight concerns about early voting anomalies.

91. He criticized the statistically uniform vote percentages across precincts in Hwang Kyo-ahn’s district, Jongno, as suspicious.
92. In another debate in October, Yoon emphasized the need for transparent elections, describing them as the cornerstone of democracy.
93. Yoon won the primary and ran in the presidential election, narrowly defeating Lee Jae-myung by 0.7%.
94. Pre-election polls predicted a significant victory margin for Yoon due to public dissatisfaction with Moon’s administration.
95. On election day, the general voting results matched expectations, with Yoon receiving 48.2% and Lee receiving 32.5%.
96. However, early voting results diverged drastically, with Yoon receiving only 36.4% and Lee receiving 52.4%.
97. Such discrepancies were statistically improbable and sparked debates over electoral transparency.
98. Early voting results, which should have aligned with the general election results as a sample, failed to do so.
99. Yoon received 36.4% in early voting compared to Lee’s 52.4%, an outcome that was statistically implausible.
100. This raised significant questions about the integrity of the election process.


101. This implied that voters who participated in early voting and those who voted on election day were not homogeneous groups.
102. Of the total electorate, 77.1% cast votes, with 36.1% voting early.
103. In cases where the margin of victory is as small as 0.7%, automatic recounts are conducted in other advanced countries.
104. The threshold is 0.5% in the U.S. and 1.0% in Canada, and recounts have revealed errors in the past.
105. Despite having grounds to contest the results, Lee Jae-myung did not request a recount.
106. Upon inauguration, Yoon Suk-yeol relocated the presidential office to Yongsan.
107. Although criticized as a waste of taxes, he insisted on the move to avoid the symbolism of imperial presidential power.
108. A-WEB, the Association of World Election Bodies, is an international NGO established by South Korea’s National Election Commission in 2013.
109. It was founded under the pretext of supporting elections in developing countries.
110. A-WEB set up servers and installed Korean-made electronic vote counters in countries like El Salvador, Congo, Ecuador, Romania, the Dominican Republic, and Kyrgyzstan.

111. These countries are major participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
112. Coincidentally, these countries began experiencing violent clashes over election results that diverged from public sentiment.
113. Examples include Iraq's 2018 parliamentary election, Congo's 2019 presidential election, Bolivia's 2019 presidential election, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan's 2020 presidential elections, Iraq's 2021 parliamentary election, and Congo's 2023 presidential election.
114. Except for Iraq and El Salvador, public outrage revealed electoral fraud in the other countries.
115. Results counted by Korean-made electronic vote counters differed from manual recounts.
116. Discrepancies were found between the number of ballots, server records, and the integrated voter registry.
117. Constitutional courts in these countries nullified the elections based on these discrepancies.
118. Before South Korea's 20th presidential election, Ahn Cheol-soo united with Yoon Suk-yeol against Lee Jae-myung.
119. On March 3, the day before early voting began on March 4, Ahn announced his withdrawal.
120. Early voting ballots were modified to include “withdrawn” next to Ahn’s name and printed on-site immediately.

121. Manipulating early voting would have required discarding pre-printed ballots and printing new ones within a day.
122. During the vote count, inexplicable anomalies were discovered in early voting ballots.
123. Some ballots had two voter stamps stuck together, and others were found to be crisp and unfolded, as if freshly printed.
124. In the April 2024 general election, early voting results again deviated from the overall voter population, and the Democratic Party won 190 seats.
125. Ballots with the "special material for shape restoration" explanation by the National Election Commission reappeared in the early voting boxes.
126. These ballots reignited suspicions of electoral fraud among conservatives.
127. Lawsuits to nullify the election were filed, but courts rejected requests to preserve ballot evidence.
128. The notion of systematic election fraud in a culturally advanced country like South Korea was dismissed as a conspiracy theory.
129. Despite material and circumstantial evidence, it was impossible to identify a clear control tower.
130. Three months after the general election, in July 2024, before the U.S. presidential election, Trump’s close aides visited South Korea.

131. They included Fred Fleitz, former White House NSC Chief of Staff; Yates, former China Policy Chair;
132. and Vivek Ramaswamy, who was nominated as Secretary of Government Efficiency alongside Elon Musk for Trump’s second term.
133. These individuals met with South Korean attorney Park Ju-hyun, who had been exposing election fraud.
134. They sought legal advice from Park regarding election fraud prevention.
135. Park suggested stationing lawyers at polling stations to monitor and provide immediate legal support to voters.
136. Vivek Ramaswamy discussed the details with Park for hours after hearing her advice.
137. The U.S. presidential election began.
138. In early September 2024, absentee voting started in North Carolina, followed by Alabama and Kentucky.
139. In October 2024, early and absentee voting began in Arizona, Georgia, and North Carolina.
140. The U.S. holds early and absentee voting for about two months before the main voting day.

141. The Republican National Committee (RNC) recruited 100,000 lawyers before the election but ultimately mobilized 6,000.
142. These lawyers compiled and studied election-related laws on their own initiative.
143. As the election began, they traveled nationwide with Republican volunteers to monitor polling stations.
144. Many non-citizens who attempted to vote were turned away.
145. Suspicious activities were live-streamed via hotlines, and lawyers immediately cited legal statutes on-site.
146. After voting concluded, they operated "war rooms" to monitor ballot boxes 24/7.
147. Despite criticism for voter intimidation and election interference, Americans demanded electoral integrity.
148. On November 6, 2024, Trump defeated Kamala Harris to win the presidency.
149. Intelligence officers monitored individuals entering and exiting the Election Training Center in Suwon.
150. December 2 marked Ghana’s early voting day for its presidential election.


151. Manipulating Ghana’s early voting required the actual number of early voters and exit poll results.
152. That night, individuals at the Election Training Center awaited Ghana’s exit poll results.
153. On December 3, Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law late at night.
154. Martial law troops were simultaneously dispatched to three locations.
155. The first was the National Election Commission (NEC).
156. In July 2023, Yoon had planted hacking codes in the NEC servers under the guise of NIS security inspections.
157. Data tracking during the April 2024 general election revealed real-time changes in vote counts.
158. An intelligence officer confirmed that the NEC servers were still using the same IP addresses.
159. The second location was the Public Opinion Survey Committee.
160. Opinion polls are tools to shape public acceptance of election results.

161. As of November 2023, Yoon led Lee by over 10%.
162. By January 2024, the gap narrowed to within 5%.
163. In February 2024, polls began showing Lee narrowly defeating Yoon.
164. Opinion polls set target figures, aligning early and election day votes to match the poll results.
165. Around 40 martial law soldiers entered, cut the building’s power, and secured the servers.
166. They seized data records and directives regarding target figures.
167. The third location was the Election Training Center.
168. On December 3, about 90 people, including NEC officials and foreigners, were at the center.
169. They were there to oversee Ghana’s early voting through A-WEB.
170. The key NEC personnel included around 10 Chinese naturalized Koreans and their families.

171. The rest were IT developers, data engineers, statisticians, and translators for English-Chinese and Korean-Chinese.
172. Martial law soldiers were armed with live ammunition to prepare for potential resistance.
173. NEC personnel resisted but were quickly subdued.
174. Among those present were 40 translators and other experts.
175. They were arrested, loaded onto buses, and taken to the Pyeongtaek U.S. military base.
176. Like the NEC, entry to Pyeongtaek requires adherence to SOFA agreements.
177. At the Election Training Center, martial law troops carried out detentions, kidnappings, and arrests.
178. The media remained silent about those who disappeared.
179. Hoping to avoid further complications, no articles were published.
180. Coordination with U.S. forces was possible because Trump’s next administration had been informed in advance.

181. Evidence pinpointed A-WEB’s involvement in organizing election fraud.
182. Yoon Suk-yeol and Trump were in negotiations with China.
183. China offered various compromises and might attempt to cut ties with its operatives in South Korea.
184. The martial law declaration was unwelcome for Lee Jae-myung, who was losing credibility.
185. Extreme orders were diminishing his leadership.
186. While U.S. cooperation was a given, America’s passive stance was deliberate.
187. South Korea needs to develop its own mechanisms for self-correction.
188. It will take time for citizens to find and digest information independently.
189. The tide is slowly turning as more people begin to wake up.
190. South Koreans overcame early voting manipulation and elected Yoon Suk-yeol with a margin of 0.7%.

191. The country’s fate was not entirely doomed.
192. While working at his office, Yoon Suk-yeol received news that his father’s condition was critical.
193. He arrived at the hospital just 20 minutes before his father passed away.
194. Yoon Ki-jung left his son with his final words:
195. “Thank you for growing up well.”